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Abstract
Flood management policy has been the subject of an international joint research
project with the Upper Tisza in Hungary as its pilot study area. Design specifica-
tions for a geographically explicit simulation model are presented. Potential flood
management policies, based on surveys and interviews with stakeholders, are pre-
sented. Some experiments on an executable prototype of the simulation model are
also reported on, where the consequences of flood management policies are inves-
tigated. Focus has been on financial policy measures, mainly insurance. Besides
more traditional evaluation of policy scenarios, the model incorporates adaptive
optimisation functionality. The report incorporates three contributions:
1. the insurance policy issue in Hungary is framed in the broader context of flood
management
2. the structuring of a flood risk policy model, capable of simulating flood failures
and estimating the economic consequences
3. reports from policy experiments performed on the implemented prototype
flood risk policy model
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Spatial and Dynamic Modelling of
Flood Management Policies in the Upper Tisza
Lisa Brouwers (lisa@dsv.su.se)*
1 Introduction
The research project “Flood Risk Management Policy in the Upper Tisza Basin: A
System Analytical Approach” is funded by FORMAS (the Swedish Research Coun-
cil for Environment, Agricultural Sciences and Spatial Planning), see the project
proposal and the progress report [27, 25] for more information. The partners in the
project are (1) the International Institute for Applied Systems Analyses (IIASA) in
Laxenburg, Austria, (2) the Department of Computer and Systems Sciences (DSV),
Stockholm University/KTH, Sweden, and (3) the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
It is carried out within the Risk Modelling and Society (RMS) project at IIASA,
and seeks to:
1. Prepare a case study of the 1998 floods in the Upper Tisza basin, Hungary.
2. Gather data and perform interviews on the interests, views of fairness and
concerns of different stakeholders to use as a foundation when constructing
policies for Hungarian national flood risk management program.
3. Implement and test a catastrophe model of the area, which includes hydrolog-
ical models of the flood, and interdependencies between policy strategies and
the distribution and frequency of risk, cost, losses, and benefits.
The work presented in this report is a summary of the work that I performed
at the YSSP (Young Scientists Summer Program) 2000, at IIASA. A flood risk pol-
icy model was structured, capable of simulating flood failures in the Palad-Csecsei
basin of the Upper Tisza and produce geographically explicit distributions of prop-
erty losses. An additional requirement wasw that it should be possible to test
different policy strategies on the model: the economical consequences should vary
with the policy strategy. An executable prototype model was implemented, based
on the identified model structure. Some experiments were performed to validate the
structure of the model.
I would like to emphasize that the work presented in this report builds heavily
on earlier work performed in the Risk, Modelling, and Society (RMS) project at the
*Department of Computer and Systems Sciences (DSV), Stockholm University/KTH, Fo-
rum 100, SE-164 40 Kista, Sweden
– 2 –
IIASA. Yuri Ermoliev and Tatiana Ermolieva have contributed with expertise in the
fields of mathematics and statistics for disaster management, see [10, 2, 8, 9, 11].
Istva´n Galambos has provided detailed information on the hydrology of the Upper
Tisza river. A flow model of parts the Upper Tisza river and an inundation model
for the Palad-Csecsei basin was made [34, 11]. Surveys and interviews with the
stakeholders in Upper Tisza were made by Anna Va´ri and Joanne Linnerooth-Bayer
[38, 39, 40, 18, 27, 25]. Linnerooth-Bayer has also investigated catastrophe man-
agement globally, and the use of insurance [4, 3, 23, 24, 26]. External sources of
information has mainly been a report on the Hungarian flood control development,
by the World Bank [37], information and statistics on natural disasters from Mu-
nichRe [30], writings by Yevjevich [41] on flood control in Hungary, and by Reitano
[31] about flood insurance programs.
1.1 Aim
The aim of this report is threefold. A justification for each aim is given in the
bulleted list items:
1. To frame the insurance policy issue in Hungary in the context of flood risk
policy issues more generally.
• A broad background is needed to understand the policy problem of today
2. To structure a flood risk policy model that is capable of simulating the flood
failures, and to estimate the consequences of different flood risk management
strategies for different stakeholders.
• Due to large uncertainties and many possible states, it is not possible
to analytically estimate the consequences of a certain strategy; instead
simulation can be used
• It is important that the model can represent different perspectives; a
strategy might be beneficial to one stakeholder and not to another
• Scenario testing can lead into numerous iterations, with small changes of
the parameters before next round, an automatic adaption of the parameter-
values would be useful
3. To implement a prototype of the model and perform some policy experiments
on it.
• The prototype model should illustrate the important features, identified
during the structuring, and by performing tests on the prototype model,
the structure can be validated
A fourth goal, which points out the direction of future work, is to demonstrate
how the model can be made useful in a participatory decision making process. The
stakeholders could interact with the model by running scenarios and changing pa-
rameters. This fourth goal will not be addressed explicitly in this report, but in
later stages of the project.
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1.2 Methodology
I have used a system-theoretic perspective in this explorative research. Initially, a
broad understanding of the Hungarian policy problem was gained through literature
studies and discussions with Linnerooth-Bayer, Ermolieva, Ermoliev, and Galam-
bos. After this initial wide approach to the problem, a second phase of abstraction
took place when the most important features of the problem were identified and a
structure of the flood risk management model was made; the different modules, the
data requirements, and the relations, were identified.
The most important features of the structured model were represented in an exe-
cutable prototype model, implemented by myself and Karin Hansson. The prototype
model was built in the mathematical programming language Matlab, and was based
on earlier catastrophe simulation models made by Ermolieva [10, 2]. The prototype
model integrated data from the different systems that were considered relevant to
the problem; the hydrological system, the geographical system, the social system,
and the economical system. A series of experiments on different policy strategies
was performed on the prototype model, to test if the model structure was realistic.
During these initial phases I worked at IIASA, located in Laxenburg, Austria.
I shared an office with Hansson why a close cooperation was natural. The vicinity
of other project members also made an intense exchange of ideas and information
possible. It is difficult to divide the contributions between myself and Hansson,
and the following is a simplification: my responsibilities have been to integrate all
data and relations into one executable simulation model, while the responsibilities
of Hansson have been to identify and implement the different goal functions and
wealth transformation functions of the stakeholders.
1.3 Disposition
Chapter 2 discusses climate changes in general and the possible consequences to
the hydrological system. An introduction to the conditions in Hungary and the
specific river basin is also given in this chapter. Chapter 3 describes different flood
management strategies. Chapter 4 gives a picture of the Hungarian policy problem,
with focus on insurance issues. In Chapter 5, the problem is described in terms
of interacting systems, and from this a rationale for the Tisza model is given, and
the functions to be included in the model are listed. The use of computer models
in participatory decision making is discussed in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 discusses
conditions for it to be useful as a tool for policy-makers. The different proposed
modules of the Tisza model are described in Chapter 8, and in Chapter 9 some
experimental results from the executable prototype model are presented. Chapter 10
includes the conclusions, and a brief discussion on future extensions of the model.
2 Background
2.1 Climate Change
There are strong indications that humans are gradually but definitely changing the
climate of the earth. Emissions from fossil fuels and greenhouse gases are altering the
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atmosphere, leading to an uncertain future of global warming, see, e.g., Jepma and
Munasinghe [19]. The increased atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases lead
to increases of global mean temperatures. The problem that usually is referred to
as the“greenhouse effect” has developed since the Industrial Revolution. Emissions
from the combustion of fossil fuels create a blanket of gases around the atmosphere
of the earth. The heat of the earth does not escape properly through this layer
of gas, with an increased temperature as result. Global surface temperatures have
increased about 0.6◦C since the late 19th century, and about 0.2 to 0.3◦C over the
past 25 years, according to data from U.S. National Climatic Data Center, 2001.
The global warming will affect the hydrological cycle. This occurs because a
part of the heating will go into evaporating larger quantities of water from the
surface of the earth. The atmosphere is also capable of supporting greater amounts
of water vapour. In general, an increase in the proportion of extreme and heavy
precipitation events would occur where there is enough atmospheric instability to
trigger precipitation events. This intensification of the hydrological cycle means
more flooding with an increase in extreme precipitation events (cf. [20]). In a
report, following meteorological parameters were stated as being the most important
for flooding (cf. [35]):
• Precipitation (type, intensity, and volume)
• Temperature
• Wind speed
• Season of year
Although the impacts of sea level rise and associated coastal flooding have been
more widely discussed, global climate change could also change the frequency and
severity of inland flooding, particularly along rivers. It is also possible that increased
flooding could occur in areas that do not become wetter. This is illustrated by four
examples:
1. Earlier snowmelt could intensify spring flooding.
2. The need to ensure summer/drought water supplies could lead water managers
to keep reservoir levels higher and thereby limiting the capacity for additional
water retention during unexpected wet spells.
3. Warm areas generally have a more intense hydrologic cycle and thus more rain
in a severe storm.
4. Finally, many areas may receive more intense rainfall.
2.2 Natural Catastrophes
The number of great natural catastrophes has risen, by a factor of three in the time
period 1950–2000, see Munich Re [30]. Economic losses, after being adjusted for
inflation, have risen by a factor of nine. According to Loster [28], the three main
reasons for this dramatic development are:
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1. The concentration of population and values in high-risk zones.
2. The greater susceptibility of modern industrial societies to catastrophes.
3. The accelerating deterioration of natural environmental conditions.
There are also more and more indications of a climate-related accumulation of ex-
treme weather events. In Figure 1, the number of great natural catastrophes is
Figure 1: Number of great nature catastrophes 1950–2000,data from MunichRe.
compared over the decades, and a dramatic increase is revealed. Munich Re [30]
considers a natural catastrophe to be great if the ability of the region to help itself
is insufficient, why interregional or international assistance proves to be necessary.
When the number of catastrophes is increasing, the financial losses escalate as well,
see Figure 2.
Figure 2: Economic losses from natural catastrophes world-wide, data from Mu-
nichRe.
A key problem for policy makers is to find ways to improve resilience and to
protect society effectively against the increasing risk [8]. Questions of accountability
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and liability for preventing and absorbing the financial losses are on the political
agenda in most countries.
2.3 Hungary in General
Hungary is a country where as much as 20 per cent of its 93 000 square metres
of territory are at risk for flooding. The Upper Tisza region is one of the largest,
natural riverside systems in Central Europe. A concentration of capital and people
in risk prone areas result in increasing economical losses [23]. Due to agricultural
activities and deforestation in the flood plains upstream, the water carrying capacity
of the flood channels is deteriorating. Sedimentation also raises the terrain level of
the unprotected flood plain. According to Kozak and Ratky [21], these factors result
in ever-increasing flood levels.
2.4 The Tisza River and Upper Tisza Area
The Tisza is the second largest river in Hungary. It is a slowly flowing river with a
gentle slope, famous for its beauty. Its water is a very important resource to Eastern
Hungary. The entire stretches of the river Tisza is 800 km, the parts in Hungary
sum up to 597 km. Through Upper Tisza, the river stretches for 235 km. It collects
the waters of the Eastern half of the Carpathian basin. The source of the river is at
the foot of the Magyar-Havasok Mountains, situated in Ukraine.
The study area for the Tisza project is Pilot Basin no 2.55, the Palad-Csecsei
basin, see Figure 3. The basin lies on the eastern part of Hungary. Boundaries of
the flood plain: from North and West the River Tisza, from East the Creek Bata´r
and Creek Pala´d, from South the River Tu´r. The area of the pilot basin is 107 km2,
and it is located in the Szabolcs-Szatma´r-Bereg County, see Figure 4. The number
of persons living in the pilot basin accounts for only 2 per cent of all inhabitants
in the County, an indication on how small the pilot basin is. The generality of the
findings of this study can therefore be questioned. The reason for choosing such a
small area for a case study was that we had detailed data available only for this
area.
As much as 38 per cent of the land in the County is at flood risk. Because of
few lakes in the Carpathian Mountains, the contrast between the maximum and
minimum level of water is large; the level can increase by as much as 12 metres,
see [36] for more information. When the flood waves arrive on the Tisza River, the
speed can be extremely high, giving little time for preparation. The lack of lakes
is also the explanation to the three annual floods. The first flood occurs in early
spring, the second in early summer, and the third in the autumn. Apart from the
minor or moderate annual floods, extreme floods occur every 10–12 years. During
the last years the extreme floods appear to have become more frequent [40].
A 627-km long primary levee system protects the area from floods together with
a secondary line along 94 km of the river. The nature is to a large degree untouched,
as much as 4.3 per cent of the county, 25 500 ha, is nature conservation area with rare
fauna and flora. The region is also famous for its historic importance. Archaeological
findings prove that the region was inhabited already in the Neolithic period.
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Figure 3: Basin 2.55, the study area for the Tisza Project, figure courtesy of VITUKI
Figure 4: The County Szabolcs-Szatma´r-Bereg.
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It is a poor area, especially the rural areas along the river. Here, the population
is very much dependent on the income from agriculture, which is not enough to
support the local population. The distance between the small settlements and the
cities is large, and the road connections are in a bad state. Many farmers are forced
to sell their land, forests, and equipment due to economic difficulties. The situation
is further aggravated by a number of severe floods in recent years. Since 1970, major
floods have occurred in 1993, 1995, 1998, 1999, 2000, and in 2001 [18].
Statistics show that the region is one of the poorest in Hungary, and has a
smaller agricultural production than most other regions. In 1998, the Szabolcs-
Szatma´r-Bereg region had the lowest average yield among Hungary’s all 27 agricul-
tural regions, for wheat, barley, as well as for potatoes, see Table 1.
Product Position (27 regions)
Wheat 27
Rye 22
Barley 27
Maize 21
Sugar-beet 7
Potatoes 27
Grapes 23
Table 1: National rankings of the Szabolcs-Szatma´r-Bereg region with respect to
average yield, 1 means highest production among all regions and 27 means lowest.
The figures were collected from the Hungarian Central Statistics Office [22], and
reflect the year 1998.
About 200 000 people, located in 118 settlements, live in the Szabolcs-Szatma´r-
Bereg county. The gross domestic product per capita, expressed as percentage of the
national average, was 57 in 1998. This county had the lowest GDP of all counties in
Hungary, 567 000 HUF as compared to 1 858 000 HUF in Budapest, or 30.5 per cent
of the GDP in Budapest. The number of unemployed was the highest in the country,
11 per cent. The beautiful areas along the Tisza would suggest a great potential for
tourism and water sport activities, but this is not the case. Poor infrastructure is
one explanation of why the tourism and recreation sectors are still weak here, and
the cyanide spill in 2000 did not make the situation better for the young tourism
industry. Greenpeace [14] among others has produced an in-depth report about the
spill.
2.5 Hungarian Flood Risk Management
Flood risk management can be divided into pre-flood and post-flood actions. The
pre-flood actions aim at reducing the risk for floods to occur, or to minimize the
damages by moving houses out from the area for instance. Mitigation and response
belong to this category. Post-flood actions include recovery and loss-sharing.
Flood protection in Hungary has a long history, and mitigation has been the
dominating strategy. On January 1st, 1001 the Christian Hungarian Kingdom had
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already started regulating river flows and constructing protection structures against
floods that endangered life and property. From documents dating back to the 13th
century, it shows that it was the responsibility of the society to control floods and
to minimize the risk of flooding. This view still holds, the interviews held in Upper
Tisza [39] showed that most people feel that the government should compensate
the victims if a levee fails. This has also been the policy, the government has a
responsibility both to protect and compensate.
The technical and economical development in the 17th century made a more
modern flood control approach possible. This was urgently needed as 4 000 000 ha
(more than 40 per cent of the total territory of Hungary) used to be inundated when
the Tisza flooded.
Before the regulations, it used to flow through the deeper parts of the Great
Plains freely, causing severe damage to the arable-land agriculture. In order to
increase the productivity in the region, the public appeal for river regulation grew.
During the second half of the 18th century and the first half of the 19th century,
activities like mapping, data gathering, planning, and designing provided the bases
for flood control. The most urgent development goals for Hungary were formulated
by count Istvan Sze´chenyi. Flood control and regulations of rivers were given top
priority. Sze´chenyi started a national river regulation and flood control program on
the Tisza River in August 1846. The plans designed within this program were almost
entirely implemented during the last one and half century, as reported by Hanko´
[16]. During this time, Hungary became the scene of Europe’s largest river controls.
Large portions of land that earlier were flooded by the Tisza, were transformed into
arable land. The result of these efforts is an extensive system of levees, controlling
3 860 km of the river.
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3 Flood Management Strategies
Flood risk management strategies can be structured into pre-flood strategies and
post-flood strategies, this is one of many possible categorisations of the different
strategies:
1. Pre-flood strategies
• Mitigation
– Structural measures
∗ Levees, dikes, dams, and reservoirs
– Non-structural measures
∗ Change location: relocate properties to less vulnerable places
∗ Change land use: coding, zoning, proofing, and re-naturalisation
• Adaptation
– Loss Sharing
∗ Flood insurance: Public, Private, and mixed (public/private)
• Response
– Preparedness (early warning)
– Awareness and training
2. Post-flood strategies (recovery)
• Bear losses (self-help)
• Share losses
– Governmental funds
– Insurance
– Charity
• External aid (international)
Mitigation: Structural Measures
The most ambitious flood control measures within this group are levees, dikes, and
flood-walls. Apart from assisting in flood control these structures also provide for
irrigation, recreation, and hydroelectric power.
Levees are embankments along the course of a river. Many rivers produce levees
naturally during floods when the overflowing river deposits debris along the bank.
Gradually this builds up and contains the stream into the channel. Artificial lev-
ees are constructed in much the same manner. They may be temporary, as when
sandbags are used during flooding, or permanent when the banks are raised to keep
the river in its channel during times of increased water flow. Levees protect the
surrounding countryside from floods by holding more water in the channel. They
also aid in navigation by deepening the channel. A flood-wall is very much the same
as a levee, but built out of concrete or masonry, instead of sand. Dikes are similar
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to flood-walls in all respects except that they usually refer to holding back large
standing bodies of water, such as an ocean. A system of dikes prevents the North
Atlantic Ocean from flooding the Netherlands.
Mitigation: Non-Structural Measures
The most typical feature of the measures belonging to the group of non-structural
measures, is that they do not alter the physical characteristics of the river. These
measures instead aim at changing the consequences of floods. For the last fif-
teen years, there has been a change in focus away from structural mitigation to
non-structural mitigation measures. In industrialised countries, one possible non-
structural solution is re-location. Families and businesses are moved out of the flood
plain. This method is not commonly used, as there are many problems related to
moving people. Even if such a policy would be economically rational, it is not often
liked by the people living in the flood plain, why it is politically incorrect in most
countries. In a land area with a given risk of inundation, regulations prescribe what
can be done. It might for instance be forbidden to build certain types of industries in
areas with a high risk of inundation. Because of the cost and environmental impacts
of flood-protection structures, many parts of the United States rely on land-use reg-
ulations to prevent flood damages. This view is gaining popularity also in Hungary.
Prime Minister Viktor Orban said in a radio interview that he would try to block
local governments from issuing building permits in flood plains.1
Response and Recovery
Different concepts such as flood forecast, flood warning, and evacuation programs
are grouped under this label. Awareness programs are tailored to fit the specific
village or community at risk. The community engagement is very important for
preventing a natural disaster or reducing the effects of a natural disaster. In very
short time the event can occur, why external help may not reach its location in time.
The organisation and education of local volunteers is more and more recognised as
an important flood risk management strategy [1].
Loss Sharing
In most countries the government compensated victims from natural disasters to
some extent. While British people get almost no compensation at all in case of a
flood, Hungarian people are used to receiving full compensation. For large disasters,
where the region lacks funds for recovery, aid from other regions or from other
countries are quite common. In countries with restrictive government compensation,
the individual can buy additional protection in form of insurance. Insurance is a
way to distribute the losses over time and between policy holders. There are many
different types of insurance, some are strictly commercial while others are fully
or partly run by the government. A well functioning loss sharing mechanism is
1He also said that he would see to it that a National Lands Foundation is set up to stop
cultivation of farmlands that are frequently flooded [12].
– 12 –
important for the recovery of a region or a country. The risk is often reflected in the
size of the insurance premia, or no insurance is offered at that location. In either
case, the property owner has to pay for choosing to live in a high-risk area. This
could be considered fair, or unfair. The design and implementation of loss-sharing
strategies in a country is tightly connected with political and ideological views. By
implementing good loss-sharing strategies, the losses can be reduced. If a property
owner has to take private precautions, in terms of proofing the cellar for instance,
to be able to buy insurance, then the losses are likely to be lowered.
3.1 Approaches to flood risk management
Different stakeholders have expressed their opinions on flood risk management poli-
cies in interviews [38, 39]. Based on these opinions, the following categorisation has
been made by Linnerooth-Bayer. It is strongly stylized, and tries to illuminate the
differences in the approaches:
1. Hierarchical approach
This approach promotes governmental responsibility, with no private respon-
sibility. Large-scale structural measures are built and maintained by the gov-
ernment. If a levee fails, or if an unprotected area is flooded, the government
compensates the victims.
2. Individualistic approach
The responsibility lies on the individual, private responsibility is extensive.
People should be relocated if they live in a high-risk area, but they should
receive compensation for this. A system of private insurance is an ingredient,
with a margin for private incentives; in order to get a reduced premium of the
ground has to be waterproofed, for instance.
3. Naturalistic approach
This approach considers floods as natural, it would be better to take down
the levees and let the hydrological balance take over. The government should
actively support sustainable development. An alternative non-profit insurance
system could be a part of this picture.
In countries like Australia, USA, and the Netherlands, there has for the last
fifteen years been a change in focus away from large-scale structural measures to non-
structural mitigation measures. There is a growing recognition that the problem of
flooding cannot be successfully managed by structural mitigation solutions as these
deal with the symptoms of the problem, and not the problem itself.
The increasing concentration of people and property in flood-prone areas raises
questions of responsibility and vulnerability. By building flood-walls and dams the
frequency of floods in an area is reduced, allowing for changes in land use. The flood
risk is not eliminated, however. The structures only give protection up to a certain
flood level, and there is also a risk of failure of the structures. Large expensive
structural measures initiated and supported by the government, seems to be very
much off the current policy agenda, this view was put forward at the Australian
Disaster Conference [1]. A new holistic view recognises the importance of working
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in harmony with nature and of approaching the problem of flooding in terms of
responsible management and restoration of the natural function of rivers. Instead of
spending public funds on flood mitigation structures, concrete channels are removed
and the original meandering streams are restored. This new ecological approach
has different names in different places, such as Total Catchment Management in
Australia and Watershed Management in the United States.
4 The Hungarian Insurance Policy Problem
The cost for protection and loss reduction is peaking and the Hungarian govern-
ment is considering a flood management program where private insurance plays an
important role. One reason for such a program is that it is a fairer way of sharing
the losses from flooding: people who choose to live in flood-prone areas should carry
a larger financial responsibility. Another vital reason is said to be that private in-
surance would modify the population distribution so that fewer people would live in
flood-prone areas. This is supposed to be the effect of reflecting the risk-proneness
of a geographical location in the size of the insurance premium. The people who
prefer to live in a flood-prone area must either be willing to pay high premiums or
to bear the loss themselves in case of a flood. In Upper Tisza, few people would
afford private insurance without subsidies from the government or cross-subsidation
among the insurance takers, which raises questions on equity and fairness. Should
poor people be forced to move from areas where their families might have lived for
generations?
4.1 Distribution of the Economical Responsibility
In most countries, the government helps the victims of a natural catastrophe. This
can be viewed as a public insurance method, as all taxpayers contribute to the gov-
ernmental budget through their taxes. To date, this form of collective loss sharing,
financed by the tax-payers of today and of tomorrow, plays the most important role
in absorbing the financial losses from the victims of natural disasters [4]. In some
countries, these premium funds are treated separately in a national disaster fund or
a catastrophe pool, while in others the premiums are not separated from the state
budget. Instead of a private insurance company, the government institutes this in-
surance program. The National Flood Insurance Program in the US is an example
on a governmental insurance, insurance is not mandatory, but it is a pre-requisite for
being allowed a loan where the property is the security (a mortgage). The rationale
for this system is that private insurers would stand too high a risk of bankruptcy.
At the other end of the scale of responsibility lies private insurance. The private
insurance can be combined with a public guarantee to assure that the insurers can
rely on financial backing to avoid insolvency in case of exceptional floods. Private
insurance is often restricted by many exceptions. In the Upper Tisza flood basin,
insurance is only available for households in protected areas, and the insurance only
cover inundation resulting from catastrophic failure of major levees.
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4.2 Responsibility for Compensation of Losses
The Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban declared that the state would com-
pensate for most road damage, and was likely to decide in favour of assisting local
governments in repairing damage to roads they own, from the flooding in spring
2000. He also said that the government would not categorically reject any claim
related to flood damage, see ReliefWeb [12]. In Hungary there is no explicit duty of
the government to compensate flood victims, but it is the policy followed in practice.
Around the world different countries have implemented different strategies on how
to carry the economic responsibility. In most countries, it is common to compensate
flood victims except for a few countries like the UK and Australia; more information
can be found in a World Bank report [37]. In Italy, the government used to com-
pensate most of the losses for the victims. As they have to live up to the Maastricht
restrictions on government deficit relative to GDP, they are now however looking
for ways of passing a large part of the compensation to the private sector; for more
thorough information, consult Mitchell [29].
4.3 International Implications
The most recent flooding has also highlighted the international implications of the
problem, as reported in the Swedish newspaper DN [6]. The Hungarian part of
the Upper Tisza region borders to Slovakia, the Ukraine, and to Romania. Prime
Minister Orban accuses the neighbouring countries Romania and Ukraine for causing
the flood by massive deforestation along the Tisza River. The effect of the cutting
of trees is that the melt water from the snow in the Carpathian Mountains is not
absorbed by the soil, but instead fills the river channel.
4.4 Current Flood Management Strategies in Hungary
The use of structural measures is still very much on the political agenda. In the
spring of 2000, Hungary received a World Bank study free of charge that proposed
to build dams at a length of 740 km over 10 years at an estimated cost of HUF
60 billion. The Hungarian government has allocated an equally large amount to
reinforce dams during the same time period, according to the Hungarian American
List [15].
There are also discussions on the possibilities of implementing a National Insur-
ance system. The advocators of such a system stress the usefulness of an economical
fund, or pool. Having the entire population contribute via an insurance channel
would finance this pool. By spreading the contribution to the pool equally, the pre-
miums in areas where the risk is high can be kept on an acceptable level. The pool
would serve at least two purposes. First, to acr as capital buffer needed for insurance
companies dealing with catastrophic risks. As the events are interdependent, the
companies stand a high risk of insolvency if a large flood occurs. In Hungary, there
are only 17 non-life insurers at work, as compared to 200 in Ukraine. A pool could
play the role of a risk reserve for the insurers, making the difference between insol-
vency or survival and also a means to keep the premiums on an affordable level. The
second purpose would be to minimize costs for the government in terms of economic
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compensation to the victims. At present only 60 per cent of the 3.8 million house-
holds are insured in Hungary and in the Upper Tisza region as few as 30 per cent
carry property insurance. Possible explanations of this can be economic situation,
as poor households cannot afford to pay the premiums, regardless of the size. The
households with higher income feel they cannot afford insurance, as the premiums
reflect the risk in the region. In some areas, insurance companies are not offering
insurance due to high hazard potential possibly in combination with a history of
high claims. Some of the buildings are considered uninsurable, as they do not meet
the minimum construction standards stated by the insurers. When a catastrophe
occurs, the joint efforts of the local inhabitants have proved to be the most efficient
defence. For instance, in November 1998, the dikes failed in the Ukrainian section
of the Tisza River and destroyed several communities. As a result of heroic flood-
fighting efforts, the river did not overtop the dikes in the Hungarian section, but
damages caused to levees, roads, and agricultural production in the flood plain were
significant. The adoption of a stakeholder approach is one way of addressing the
need for commitment among volunteers. In Hungary the participation of citizens
is not yet developed. The local and regional defence and evacuation plans are not
public, leaving the people at risk with insufficient knowledge for taking proper ac-
tion in case of flooding [40]. The cyanide spill in the spring of 2000 brought with
it raised voices for a new ecological approach to flood-plain management where the
overall aim is restoration of the ecology in the region [14].
The effects of the withstanding regulations of the Tisza River are now being
debated. The dams that were built during the regulation of the river cut off the
flood plains and run-off areas from the riverbed, thus minimizing the flood-risk
beyond the dams. At the same time, the dams caused severe losses to natural
values and biodiversity. Environmental non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in
Ukraine and in Hungary have suggested that all development is stopped in the flood
prone area and that it be turned into a national park.
5 The Problem from a System-Analytic Perspec-
tive
5.1 Catastrophe Modeling
For complex problems, the use of a generalised representation, a model of the prob-
lem, is commonly used. The flood risk management problem in Upper Tisza is a
complex policy problem due to the large degree of uncertainties, the many inter-
dependencies, and the ambition to incorporate different stakeholders. As historical
data on natural catastrophes normally is insufficient for predicting events at any
particular locations, catastrophe modeling can to a certain extent compensate for
this lack of historical data.
5.2 Flood Probabilities
The probability for a flood to occur during a certain year is normally expressed
by its return period. Hydrologic frequency analysis is the evaluation of hydrologic
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records to estimate how often events of a given magnitude or greater will occur.
A 100-year flood is a flood of such magnitude that over a long period the average
time between floods of equal or greater size, is 100 years. The term return period
is treacherous as it gives a false sense of security. It is often misinterpreted to be a
statistical guarantee that hydrologic events of a given size will occur on a predictable,
fixed time schedule. The probability concerns one single year and tells nothing about
the accumulated risk during a longer period. The accumulated probability for a 100-
year flood to occur during a time period of 50 years is 39 per cent. A 100-year event
might happen once, twice, several times, or not at all during our lifetime. It is also
important to remember that the calculated probabilities only are valid for a specific
location in the river. As the conditions in regulated rivers often change, as new dams
or reservoirs are built successively, it is very difficult to estimate the likelihood for
flooding. For extreme floods, with a very long return-period, for instance a return-
period of 10 000 years, the probabilities are very hard to calculate as there are few
historical records to look at. In most cases there are not even 100 observations to
ground statistics upon.
Severe flooding in regulated rivers occur less frequently than in unregulated
rivers. Still, floods do occur in regulated rivers from time to time. When these
events occur, they are unexpected and people are not prepared. For the flood
managers and the policy-makers, it is important to remember that not all flood risk
can be eliminated by protections. Whatever mitigation measures are taken, there
is always the issue of “residual risk” and the rare event. The 1993 floods of the
Mississippi/Missouri River in the USA, when 48 people were killed, is an illustrative
example on how systems designed to prevent the relatively frequent, moderately
destructive flood, are overwhelmed and almost completely ineffective against the
more rare devastating flood. Occasionally even structures built to stand against
large floods break, either from old age or from an abundance of water. In 1228,
for instance, a major flood smashed through the first primitive dikes in Friesland,
the Netherlands, killing at least 100 000 people, see Rekenthaler [32]. Even when
levees do not break, floods can still occur. The rivers and their tributaries may for
instance swell due to large spring rains. Eventually they overflow their banks and
inundate the surrounding flood plains. The Yellow River in China is known for its
tendency to overflow its banks. Soil carried by the Yellow River has been deposited
in large amounts at the bottom of the river. Because of the soil deposits, the riverbed
has been raised, increasing the risk of flooding. In the 1887 flood, nearly a million
people died in China after the river overflowed its banks largely due to crop failures
and famine that followed from the catastrophe, as reported by the LA Emergency
Operations Bureau [7]. Seen from an economical perspective, it is impossible to
build ever-larger structures to cope with events of extremely low probability. The
cost for protection against very rare events grows exponentially. By building a new
protection at a specific location along the river, the risk is modified. The variance
and frequency of risk is transformed, but the risk is not eliminated. By building a
dam upstream, the probabilities for a flood downstream will increase. If a levee is
made higher, floods will be less frequent but the consequences more severe.
– 17 –
5.3 Rationale of the Tisza Model
The conditions in rivers are affected by many different systems, and the river system
affects them. The probabilities for a flood to occur in a river and the consequences
of a flood are related to systems of economy, ecology, meteorology, and hydrology.
These systems are in turn influenced by the conditions in the river system. In all
these systems, uncertainty is inherent. The dynamic interaction between humans,
nature and technology makes the flooding problem even more multifaceted. Be-
cause of the inherent uncertainty and complexity, flooding different from anything
experienced in the past might occur. Nature catastrophes do not repeat themselves.
The uncertainty is further aggravated by the technological revolution: new flood
protection policies make old knowledge about flood management unreliable.
The uncertainty and complexity of the flood management problem of Upper
Tisza makes it very hard to use analytical methods to estimate the consequences
of potential policy strategies. Due to the relative infrequency of catastrophes there
is also a lack of historical data concerning major floods, and data on minor and
moderate floods is of little help when assessing new policy decisions as the physical
and economical landscape is constantly changing. New houses are built and assets
are clustered in new locations. The methodology of “learning by doing” is not
applicable when coping with rare events like natural disasters. The interval between
two occurrences could be very long, and it is not morally defensible to experiment
with the security of humans in order to find good protection strategies. By combining
mathematical representations of the natural occurrence patterns and characteristics
of a flood with information on property values, construction types, and compensation
policies, a simulation model can generate loss estimates that aid the policy makers
and the stakeholders in assessing different policy strategies.
5.4 Relations in the Tisza Model
A number of relations should be represented in the model. These are listed on a
very abstract level here, and will be specified further.
• The cost function C determines the cost of mitigation for each agent.
• The flood function F determines the characteristics of the simulated flood.
• The inundation function I tells how the flood water overflows land.
• The vulnerability function V determines how vulnerable a building is.
• The damage function D determines how much damage the flood causes a
certain asset.
• The loss function L determines how large the economical losses for an agent
is, measured by the size of the replacement value.
• The wealth transformation function W determines how the wealth of each
agent changes over time.
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For the Tisza model to be useful it must illustrate the spatial and temporal de-
pendencies, specific to the studied area, and specific to each stakeholder, or agent,
represented in the model. As stated in the project description, the Tisza model is
intended to play two roles:
1. To be used as a tool in integrated assessment.
2. To assist policy makers in identifying optimal, or at least robust, policy strate-
gies.
The different roles pose different design requirements on the model, these are dis-
cussed and identified in the following two chapters.
6 Integrated Assessment
Integrated assessment (IA) can be defined as a structured process of dealing with
complex issues, using knowledge from various scientific disciplines and/or stakehold-
ers, in such a way that integrated insights are made available to decision makers [33].
There is a growing recognition that the participation of the public and other stake-
holders is an important part of IA. This view is also recognised in the Tisza project,
where it is stated explicitly as a goal to adopt an integrated participatory approach.
The method for fulfilling this goal was:
1. Extraction of mental models of organisations, institutions, and the public, as
input for the catastrophe simulation model.
• An investigation of the flood risk conditions and existing mitigation and
loss-sharing alternatives was made [24, 30, 13]
• A public survey was conducted to investigate public opinion on flood risk
policy management issues, see [38, 39]
2. Communication and development of the model, together with the stakeholders
• Interviews with stakeholders in Upper Tisza
• Presentation of the model simulations, with different policy scenarios
3. Validate the model structure and simulation results with the stakeholders
• During the final stakeholder workshop
It is, however, not self-evident how to design a model to be useful in IA. The
setting where a group of stakeholders and public participators use the model collab-
oratively is very different from more traditional use where an expert policy-maker
consults the model to gain insight into specific issues. There is not much informa-
tion on what methodological requirements to make on the design of the model for
participatory IA to be found. One exception is [5], the Working Paper from the
ULYSSES project. The ULYSSES project is a European research project on public
participation in Integrated Assessment. The project has aimed at advancing IA
methodologies by pursuing the following specific research goals:
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1. Advancing IA methodology by integrating computer models with a monitored
process of social learning.
2. Testing this methodology on problems of urban lifestyles and sustainability.
3. Tailoring this methodology to fit the cultural heterogeneity of the EU.
To fulfil the first objective, 52 so-called focus groups around the world were
studied. In these groups, a number of citizens together with a session leader met
approximately five times and debated climate change and different climate policies.
The focus groups used one of six state-of-the-art computer models as help within
the discussions, see Appendix B of the Working Paper [5] for a description of the
different models. The six models used are different, ranging from complex and
dynamic global models to simple accounting tools.
The results of this study are of high relevance to the design of the Tisza model,
as one of the purposes of the Tisza model is that it should be used in a participa-
tory setting where different policies are discussed and assessed by the stakeholders
involved.
6.1 Spatial and Temporal Scales
The different spatial scales in the models used by the focus groups caused problems.
While most participants considered global information as necessary for the discus-
sion, they were more interested in regional and local aspects. Climate change as a
global and long-term risk proved to lie beyond this horizon of “here and now” and
to think about it was unusual and challenging for the participants.
Issues that need to be tested and evaluated before the Tisza model is used in
a collaborative setting are what scales the model will use. The spatial data for a
pilot basin is currently available in three different scales: aggregated for the entire
basin, aggregated per municipality, and per individual cell (10× 10 metres). Should
only one of these scales be used or is it possible to combine two or more in the same
model? The time scales are also difficult, and a short time interval is required when
the catastrophes are simulated, e.g., one simulation round per month. As insurance
is on the political agenda, it must be possible to evaluate different insurance schemes,
for which a time steps of one year seems natural for testing premium sizes. As the
floods are rare, the time period covered by the model must be quite long, say, 50
years per simulation.
6.2 Complexity
In the focus groups that used computer models with a large number of interacting
variables and constants, the complexity was difficult to manage both for the par-
ticipants and for the session leader. They felt that the level of complexity was too
high for the little time available and the given scientific understanding. If the Tisza
model is to be used in a stakeholder session, the complexity will have to be reduced
as much as possible. Tests must be performed in advance to find the right balance
between reduced complexity and remained usefulness. There is a risk that a simple
model will convey simple insights, i.e. results that can be achieved without the use
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of a model. When the model is to be used in a participatory manner, the balance
between complexity of the model and time available must be good.
6.3 Exploration of Policy Options
How useful the focus groups found the model to be for exploring different policy
options depended on whether it was a global or a regional model, where the re-
gional models proved to be more useful. This result is easily understood, as the
consequences for local decisions are less uncertain than the consequences of global
decisions. However, the regional models were criticised for not addressing the ex-
ploration of policy options in a convincing way. One of the groups complained that
the model said nothing about feasibility; to what extent the measures suggested and
tried were realistic, given economic, social and political constraints. It was left to
the users of the model to critically evaluate their own selection of variables, which
made the participants in the focus group feel abandoned.
In the Tisza model, the stakeholders must be given the opportunity to explore
different policy options. An ideal situation would be if the policy variables could
be changed interactively during the session without making the model too hard to
understand.
6.4 User-Friendliness
The language used in the model proved to be a problem for many persons in the focus
groups. Several of the terms used were unknown to the participants and the leader
of the focus group had to translate into a less academic language. Regarding the
graphical user interface (GUI) of the model, most groups found that the participants
expected far more excitement in the form of fancy graphics and moving pictures,
and that the participants wanted to see colourful maps and more vivid imagery.
They felt that the graphical potential of modern PCs had not been fully utilised
and would have appreciated sounds, video-clips, etc. This would have helped the
understanding of the issues most difficult to grasp. The participants who were more
familiar with computers typically asked for more interactivity, they said that the
possibility to interactively change the values on a variable and to see the effect it
caused would give the model higher believability. When designing the Tisza model,
much effort should be put on the GUI. The users are likely to expect colours, sounds,
and possibilities to interact with the model, and there is a risk that the users will
feel disappointed if these features are left out.
7 The Tisza Model as a Tool for Policy Makers
On a very general level, the Tisza model will simulate a time period in the pilot basin,
with regard to the occurrence of floods and the consequences of them. During the
simulations there will be a flood when one of the following occurs:
• The water level (WL) exceeds the height of the levee (LH).
• The flow rate (FR) exceeds the resistance of the levee (LR).
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The Tisza model is not only designed to be useful in a participatory setting, but
for aiding policy makers in identifying good policy strategies. In a participatory
setting the use of pre-compiled scenarios can be motivated, as the goal might be
to reach consensus or to make clear where the different stakeholders disagree. A
decision-maker needs help to identify the best policy strategy given a number of
assumptions and constraints.
7.1 The Influence of Policy Strategies
The set X contains all relevant policy strategies. A specific policy strategy, xi, is
a combination of one or more policy alternatives with specified attribute values for
each attribute.
A policy alternative can for instance be the strengthening of an existing levee,
the implementation of a new flood tax, or a reduction in compensation from the
government. The task of the policy maker is to design on a policy strategy xi,
this means to set the attribute values of all alternatives in X. To indicate that an
alternative is not included in the strategy the attribute values of that alternative are
simply assigned “nil”. The consequences of a flood depend to a large degree on the
current policy strategy. The height (LH) and resistance (LR) of a levee affect the
frequency and size of floods. By adjusting the policy strategies, the overall outcome
of the simulations will be affected, why many functions depend on the value of x:
• The cost function C(x) determines the costs of mitigation for each agent. The
cost is directly linked to the current policy strategy: the strengthening of a
levee will affect the costs the government agent, for instance. The cost for a
policy strategy might be shared by all agents, through taxes, or carried by a
group of agents, the property owners for instance.
• The flood function F (t, x,WL, FR) is dynamic and determines the water level
and discharges in a number of initially specified cross sections the time t+ 1,
given the conditions at time t0. If the physical conditions in the river are
altered, if the height of a levee is increased for example, the conditions will be
affected. There is a flood whenever WL > LH (height of levee) or FR > LR
(resistance of levee), if x comprises one or more levees. With or without a
levee, a flood occurs whenever WL > borderheight.
• The inundation function I(x, t, F (t, x,WL, FR)) specifies the water levels at
all geographical cells when there has been a flood. This function is also dy-
namic, the duration of an inundation can be obtained.
• The vulnerability function V (x, SD) determines how vulnerable an asset is.
The policy strategy can affect the vulnerability, if the policy includes proofing
of all houses, then they will be less vulnerable to a flood. The specific soil type,
and land-use at the location also affect the vulnerability. This information is
gathered in the variable SD, for spatial data.
• The damage function D(I(x, t, F (t, x,WL, FR)), V (x, SD)) determines how
much damage the flood causes a certain asset. The damage is a function of
the inundation pattern, and of the vulnerability of the flooded asset.
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• The loss function L(x,D(I(x, t, F (t, x,WL, FR), V (x, SD)))) determines the
magnitude of the economical losses for an asset. The size of the losses depends
on the damages and on the current policy strategy. If x incorporates a certain
level of compensation from the government for instance, then the losses are
reduced.
• The wealth transformation functionW (x, t) determines how the wealth of each
agent is modified over time. The wealth of an agent is influenced by policy
decisions, viz. the tax level.
7.2 The Objective Function
The objective function f(x) measures the performance of a certain policy strategy at
time t. Whether the objective function should be minimized or maximised is merely
a design choice. A simple example of an objective function could be to minimize
the costs and the economic losses is shown in equation 1:
z = f(x) = C(x) + L(x) should be minimized (1)
7.3 Constraints
Policy makers have to take different kinds of constraints into consideration when
looking for the best policy strategies. These constraints might be logical, economical,
or environmental. These constraints, G(x), are expressed either as equations, or as
linear inequalities. A linear inequality might for instance be that the compensation
paid by the local government must not exceed its current wealth. The problem for
the policy maker is to find the best policy strategy x with regard to the objective
function without violating the constraints, see equation 2.
find x ∈ X
such that hi(x) = 0, i = 1, . . . , n and no constraints are violated
and z = f(x) is minimized (2)
The different policy strategies are compared against the objective function, and the
strategy that returns the smallest value of z without violating any constraints, is
the best policy strategy.
7.4 The Influence of Uncertainty
Assessing the economical consequences of a certain policy strategy is difficult, espe-
cially when dealing with potential future policy strategies. Instead of assessing the
experienced consequences of a policy, by looking back at the outcome, the conse-
quences must first be estimated.
For the Upper Tisza flood management problem, several uncontrollable, or ex-
ogenous, parameters affect the consequences of a policy strategy. The consequences
depend on the strength of a flood, the time when it happens, and the vulnerability
of the inundated property, among other things. Because the occurrence of a flood, as
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well as the consequences of it, is probabilistic, the Upper Tisza model uses stochastic
modelling techniques to generate simulated floods. A large number of conditions, or
states of the river, are simulated in an iterative process. The stochastic variables are
assigned random values from their probability distributions for each new simulation
round. The set Ω contains all states the river system can be in. Each state ωi
consists of a vector of random variables. Each random variable is assigned a value
from its corresponding probability distribution.
In flood simulation models, the random variables would typically include the
discharge and river water level, as well as key meteorological parameters like pre-
cipitation, wind-speed, and temperature. Also other variables like inflation rate and
unemployment rate could be included in Ω. It is important that the probability
distributions are carefully selected, as they constitute a key assumption about the
simulation model.
By randomly selecting a value for each variable from its distribution flood model
simulates a time period, normally a month or a year, of flood activity. A large num-
ber of such simulations are performed to ensure that the estimated consequences
of a policy strategy are representative. Many parts of the system are directly or
indirectly affected by what state the river system is in. In the mathematical repre-
sentation this is made explicit by letting the functions depend on ω, the randomly
decided state.
• The cost function C(x, ω) is dependent on ω. The inflation rate and the
weather conditions are likely to influence the cost for mitigation.
• The flood function F (t, x,WL, FR) is affected by ω through the WL function
and the flood rate (discharge) function.
• The inundation function I(t, x, ω, F ) is influenced by the values of ω. The
wind-speed and wind direction has impact on the inundation pattern.
• The vulnerability function V (x, SD) is not a function of ω.
• The damage function D(ω, I, V ) comprises uncertainty. The weather condi-
tions have impact on the damages for instance.
• The loss function L(x,D, V ) is not directly affected by ω.
• The wealth transformation function W (x, ω, t) depends on the random out-
come. The inflation rate affects the income and the expenditures.
By addressing uncertainty explicitly, the policy problem gets more complicated. If
the constraints and the objective function are affected by ω, then E, the estimated
values of the objective function and the constraints must be considered. The equa-
tion 3 describes the task of finding a policy strategy that minimizes the objective
functions without violating any constraints, when uncertainty is taken into consid-
eration.
find x ∈ X
such that Ehi(x) = 0, i = 1, . . . , n
Egi(x, ω) ≤ 0, i = 1, . . . , n no constraints are violated
and z = Ef(x, ω) is minimized (3)
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Policy makers dealing with catastrophic events must specify what risk means in
their specific policy setting, and to what extent risk should be avoided. For a flood
management problem at an abstract level, the risk function could be the probability
of a flood. When reducing risk is the single goal of a policy maker, then the objective
function consists only of a risk function. In most real situations the decision-maker
has to take other things into consideration as well. A flood management policy
strategy that suits a local government would have the risk of insolvency as a part
of the objective function, together with the objective to maximise the wealth, or
budget. An objective function can consist of one objective function combined with
one or more risk functions.
7.5 Adaptive Stochastic Simulations
When X and Ω contain more than a few items, the number of possible policy strate-
gies to evaluate becomes unmanageable. The objective function in a catastrophe
model can be non-smooth or even discontinuous. A local government would nor-
mally include the wish to maximise wealth, or maybe rather to minimize the deficits
in the objective function. A stylized trajectory of the wealth transformation would
look like an irregular stair. Simplifications of the problem, by substituting the ran-
Figure 5: A stylized trajectory of the wealth of an insurance company, three events
occur.
dom vector Ω by the expected values of the variables according to their distributions
may lead to sub-optimal decisions. The Expected Wealth would grow linearly and
insolvency would not occur at event number three, see Figure 5. The mean value
hides the extreme values, and these need to be investigated when looking at catas-
trophic risks, characterised by having low probabilities and severe consequences. By
running Monte Carlo simulations, it is possible to estimate the consequences of a
policy strategy in domains including uncertainty.
A problem with traditional simulations is that it might lead the decision-maker
into an endless number of time-consuming ‘if—then’ scenarios. Such runs start with
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an initial design of the policy strategy x, with which a large number of simulations
are run. If the outcome of the simulation proves unsatisfactory, then the policy strat-
egy is modified. For decisions with a large amount of alternative policy strategies,
this method is highly inefficient.
To aid policy makers in identifying robust policy strategies within reasonable
time limits, the Tisza model instead uses adaptive stochastic optimisation tech-
niques. This means that several simulations are run in a series. After the first
simulation the values of X are slightly changed, according to the optimisation algo-
rithm. By running a series of simulations with an automated adaption of the policy
strategy after each round, the search space is reduced, only the paths that showed
promise in earlier rounds will be further explored, see Ermolieva [8] for more detailed
information.
8 Executable Modules
The Tisza model will consist of a number of executable modules. The ones identified
so far are the Stochastic module, the Catastrophe module, the Spatial module, the
Agent module, the Consequence module, and finally the Policy and Optimisation
module.
8.1 Stochastic Module
The purpose of this module is to address the uncertainty inherent in the policy
problem. As the model will be used to assess different potential policy strategies,
the model has to deal with the uncertainty of the future. The variables, for which
we can not predict the value, are referred to as random variables in this model. The
most important variables to include in Ω are:
1. The water level (WL) at all specified cross sections
2. The flow rate (WF ) at all specified cross sections
3. Amount of precipitation (APR)
4. Intensity of precipitation (IPR)
5. Outdoor temperature (TEMP )
6. Wind speed (WS)
7. Inflation rate (IR)
8. Unemployment rate (UR)
For each variable the probability distributions must be provided. During each sim-
ulation round new values for the variables in Ω are randomly picked according to
their specified distributions.
• Input (initialisation):
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– The set Ω containing the random variables, and their corresponding dis-
tributions
• Output (each round):
– A random outcome, ωi
8.2 Catastrophe Module
In the Tisza model, the catastrophes simulated are floods, but in other applications
they might be earthquakes or cyclones. The Tisza model builds upon a catastrophe
model made by Ermolieva [10] for simulating cyclones in Italy. Hydrological experts
designed and built the catastrophe module. The Hungarian project partners pos-
sess expert knowledge in this field and they contributed two computer models, a
hydrological model and an inundation model. The two models together constitute
the catastrophe module. They are quite complex, for a more thorough description
refer to documentation [34]. However, a brief explanation of the two models will be
given here, in order to make the understanding of the data flow in the Tisza model
easier.
In the hydrological model, the river channel of the pilot basin is represented as
a network of connected hydrological units. The units are of the type cross-sections,
nodes, branches, or levees. Each type has specific characteristics in terms of water
resistance, etc. The hydrological model calculates the river water level (WL), and
the flow rate (FR) at a number of cross sections in the network. This is done each
time step, given the conditions last time step as input data. The hydrological model
corresponds to the flood function F (x, ω).
Model number two, the inundation model, specifies how the water overflows the
land neighbouring the river. Data collected from geographical information systems
(GIS) has been used to produce inundation maps. The inundation model is repre-
sented by the inundation function I(x, ω).
• Input to the Hydrological Model (initialisation):
– Descriptive data on the hydrological units (cross-sections, nodes, and
branches)
• Input to the Hydrological Model (each round):
– Current policy strategy, x
– The random outcome, ω, specifically WL and FR
• Output from the Hydrological Model:
– Water characteristics, new WL and FR, at selected cross sections
• Input to the Inundation Model (initialisation)
– Digital Elevation Map (DEM) of the pilot basin
• Input to the Inundation Model (each round)
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– Current policy strategy, x
– The random outcome, ω
– Water characteristics, new WL and FR, at selected cross sections
• Output from the Inundation Model
– Vector of inundated cells
– Information for each inundated cell:
∗ Duration of the inundation (number of days)
∗ Depth of water level
8.3 Spatial Module
The spatial features of the pilot basin are represented in three different scales. As
an aggregate of the entire pilot basin, on a municipality level where the eleven
municipalities in the basin form the units, and on a very fine-grained level where
1551 × 1551 equally large cells (10 × 10 metres) form a grid. The use of GIS data
Figure 6: A map of the pilot basin with the eleven municipalities (listed in numer-
ical order): Tiszakorod, Tiszacsecse, Milota, Sonkad, Tiszabecs, Uszka, Botpalad,
Magosliget, Tiszaberek, Kishodos, and Kispalad.
Figure courtesy of VITUKI.
makes it possible to use distributed asset data rather than data aggregated on a
municipality level or aggregated for the entire flood basin. Due to this distribution,
the model can be used to estimate the consequences of a policy strategy on the
cell-level as well as on an aggregated level, for the entire municipality.
• Input to the Spatial Module (initialisation):
– The Grid, a grid with n cells
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– Spatial data (SD) for each cell:
– Municipality code 1-11, (see Figure 6) or 0 which indicates that the cell
is outside the pilot basin
– Asset value
– Owner ID of each asset
– Current land-use (code)
– Digital elevation (metres above Baltic see level)
– Input to the Spatial Module (each round)
– Vector of inundated cells
– For each inundated cell:
∗ Duration of the inundation (number of days)
∗ Depth of water level
• Output
– For each inundated cell:
∗ SD, spatial data
8.4 Agent Module
To be useful in participatory settings it is crucial that the model can estimate the
effects of a policy strategy for different stakeholders or interest groups. The term
agent here means stakeholder or interest group as an aggregate, it does not imply
that the agent has the ability to communicate or act autonomously. It is stated
in the project description that the different stakeholders should be represented and
involved in the policy process. Many different kinds of agents can be identified as
relevant to the flood management problem, e.g, the central government, the local
government, the water bureau, the insurance companies, environmentalists groups,
farmers, and property owners.
The interests of the agents in the model are characterised by their objective
functions. Note that the objectives of the different agents could be conflicting.
A specific policy strategy might be advantageous to one agent, while devastating
to another; it is not sure that a strategy that maximizes the insurer’s profit is
popular with the individual property owner. The variable z is assigned a value from
the objective function each round of the simulation. Assessing a policy strategy
includes analysing how z changes over time for the different agents. In many cases
the economic wealth is part of the objective function for the agents, and in these
cases a wealth transformation function is required.
• Input to the Agent Module (initialisation)
– For each type of agent (aggregate)
∗ Objective function, f(x, ω)
∗ Wealth transformation function, W (t, x, ω)
∗ Initial wealth at time = t0.
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8.5 Consequence Module
For each round in the simulation when there has been a flood, the consequences
must be calculated for all affected agents. The consequences from a flood vary with
the location why spatial data is used in this module. Inundation information is
received from the Catastrophe Module and additional data on each inundated cell
is received from the Spatial Module. The damage function estimates the degree
of destruction for an asset, by looking at how vulnerable the asset is among other
things. A typical damage function for property would take into account the depth
of the inundation, the duration of it, how vulnerable the building is, and the current
weather conditions. A flood will have economic consequences for different agents in
the model, the owner of a flooded asset will have its wealth updated. The wealth
of other agents than the owner of an asset can also be affected; i.e., if the asset was
insured the insurer will have to pay compensation.
• Input to the Consequence Module (initialisation)
– For each type of asset
∗ Vulnerability function V (x, SD)
∗ Damage function D(ω, I, V )
• Input to the Consequence Module (each round)
– Vector of inundated cells
– Information for each inundated cell:
∗ Duration of the inundation (number of days)
∗ Depth of water level
∗ Spatial Data, SD, from the Spatial Module
• Output from the Consequence Module
– Updated value of damaged assets
– Updated wealth for affected agents
8.6 Policy and Optimisation Module
If the model is used for running scenarios, this module will not be turned on. If the
simulation involves optimisation of policy options, then this module is consulted each
round as the policy strategy x is shaped here. The initial strategy x is adaptively
altered to fit the overall objective function, which might be the objective function
of one of the agents or a compound function for different agents.
• Input to the Policy and Optimisation Module (initialisation):
– The set X
– Initial policy strategy, x
– Optimisation algorithm
– 30 –
– Overall objective function f(x, ω)
– Constraints G(x, ω)
• Output from the Policy and Optimisation Module (each round):
– New policy strategy x′
9 Experiments
An executable prototype catastrophe model was implemented at an early stage and
refined when more relations and data were identified. All described modules were
present in the prototype, but they were simplified to allow quick implementation
and testing. The experiments consisted of simulating a number of different financial
strategies including the optimisation of a policy variable. Two different agents were
incorporated, the property agent, and the insurer agent. The property agent was
modelled as a conceptual fusion of the physical property (the house) and the owner
of that property. The property value represented the wealth of the owner besides
how much the building was worth. The time-period simulated was 50 years, and
every simulation-year consisted of 12 simulation-months.
In the Stochastic Module it was randomly decided whether the levee in the
prototype model would be overtopped, break, or hold back the water. The variable
flood was assigned a random value between 0 and 1 from a uniform distribution with
equal probability for all values in the range, every simulation-month. If the value
was higher than a specified limit (representing the height of the levee border/the
resistance capacity), the flood broke through, or over-topped, the levee and flooded
a number of cells. As we did not have real hydrological or geographical data at that
time, the following variables were assigned values randomly:
• Location of the initial levee burst/overtopping,
one of the cells bordering the levee (equal probability).
• Initial strength of flood = γstepNo × r,
γ and r were random variables with values between 0 and 1, stepNo denoted
the order in the inundation walk, see Figure 7 where number 1 to 4 denotes
the order in which the cells are flooded. The earlier they are inundated, the
larger amount of water will cover the land.
In the experiments, the inundation walk, i.e., how the water flooded the land, was
represented by a random walk of five steps. For each step of the random walk, a new
cell was flooded, and the flood moved randomly to one of the neighbouring cells. The
strength of the variable flood was reduced for each step. The wealth transformation
functions for the property agents and the insurer agents were described in the Agent
Module. Each agent was assigned an initial wealth: for the property agents this
equalled the property value and for the insurer agents it was the risk reserve. The
wealth of all agents was updated every simulation-year.
WTt+1 = PropV alt −Dt +
noIns∑
j=1
H
j
t (x,Dt) +
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Figure 7: The flood inundates a number of cells in the grid.
Figure courtesy of VITUKI.
Figure 8: A landscape of initial property values.
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GovCompt(x,Dt)−
noIns∑
j=1
Premt(x, PropV alt) (4)
The wealth transformation function, see equation 4, of property agents describes how
the wealth (property value) is decreased with possible damages D, and increased
with possible compensations H from all insurance companies the property agent has
contracts with. The size of the compensation depended on the coverage, a variable
in the policy vector x, and on the extent of the damage that has occurred during
the year. The premiums paid to the insurance companies were deducted from the
wealth (property value).
WTt+1 = RRt −
noProp∑
j=1
Ht(x,Dt) +
noProp∑
j=1
Premt(x, PropV alt) (5)
Equation 5 describes the wealth transformation function for insurer agents. The
risk reserve, RR, of the insurance company was reduced with the sum of H, all
compensations paid during the simulation-year. The size of the compensation was a
function of the coverage offered (in x) and the size of the damage, D. The premiums
from all clients, Prem, were added to the risk reserve, the size of the premiums was
a function of x and the property value, PropV al.
Every simulation-month, when a flood occurred, the economical damages were
estimated by the Consequence Module.
Damaget = PropV alt − (γ
StepNo
× r) (6)
How much the value of a property was reduced after a flood, was decided by the
damage function, see equation 6. PropV al denoted the economical value of the
building, γ was a random variable in the range 01 which decided the strength of the
flood, represented by the variable flood. The value of flood was reduced stepwise,
for each new cell that was inundated. StepNo stated the position of the step in the
inundation walk. The random variable r, also in the range 01, was added to tune
the size of the damages.
Different policy strategies regarding insurance were investigated in the experi-
ments. The variables looked at were the premium size, and the pattern of coverage.
Each insurer agent was assigned a number of contracts, or cells, initially. The in-
surance companies offered contracts where only a part of the property value was
covered, or the entire property value. For instance, when coverage was set to 0.5
of the property in a cell, it meant that that insurance company insured 50 per cent
of the total property value. If the building was worth 100 000 HUF and a flood de-
stroyed 20 per cent of the property value, the insurance company would pay 10 000
HUF (50 per cent of the damaged value) to the property agent. A coverage set to
0, constituted that the building was uninsured and a coverage set to 1 meant that
the building was fully insured. The coverage patterns for each insurer agent were
defined in the policy vector x.
An insurer agent could have contracts with different coverage in different cells
and different insurer agents could provide insurance to the same cell, see table 2.
In a cell, the summed coverage from the different insurer agents was not allowed
to exceed 1, the building could not be insured to more than 100 per cent of its value.
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The pattern of coverage was optimised in the Policy and Optimisation Module in
the end of each simulation-year.
The three insurer agents were given identical goal functions.
Goal =
noClients∏
i=1
(Premi(x)× Covi(x)) +Risk ×min[0, RRt] (7)
should be maximized
In equation 7 the goal function for the Insurer agents is described. The goal function
was invoked for each cell and for each insurer. If the risk reserve was negative
that year, then the deficit was multiplied by the variable Risk. The size of Risk
stated the risk profile of the insurance company. A high value indicated a risk-
avoiding insurer. For each insurer the pattern of coverage was optimised each year.
A quadratic programming algorithm was used, looking at the derivatives, the risk
reserve, and the value of z (returned from the goal function), see Ermolieva [10] for
details.
9.1 Results
In the first experiment the pattern of coverage was optimised, with only one insurer
agent operating in the region. The experiments showed that a single insurer in the
area would go insolvent rather fast, unless the premiums were very high and/or the
coverage reflected the risk of the cell. The optimised coverage offered by the insurer
approached zero for high-risk cells and one for low-risk cells, see Figure 9 and figure
10. In a real situation this would mean that no insurance would be offered to
Figure 9: Initial coverage offered to five locations.
Insurer Agent Cell 1 Cell 2 Cell 3 Cell 100
1 0.0 0.5 0.3 0.0
2 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.0
3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.0
Table 2: Example patterns of coverage for three insurers.
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households located close to a river. The economic losses for the property agents
were severe as the ones who needed insurance the most could not buy it.
We introduced an additional insurance company for the next series of experi-
ments. The insurance contracts were evenly shared between the two insurers. One
cell could be insured by both insurance companies, as long as the total coverage of
the cell did not exceed one (100 per cent).
By spreading the risks this way, the insurer agents managed to avoid insolvency
as well as offer coverage also to high-risk locations. More information on the results
from the experiments can be found in [17].
10 Conclusions and Future Work
The use of models to simulate catastrophic events is very much in demand, and
the insurance industry are more and more using computer models to quantify risk,
instead of relying on traditional actuarial techniques for deciding levels of premium
and coverage. For such models to be useful it is necessary that they are geographi-
cally explicit.
The experiments performed on the prototype model shows that an integrated
approach to modelling of policy decisions is successful. During the iterative design
process relevant and realistic data has been identified, and will be included in the real
model. The implementation of the prototype model and the experiments performed
gave clear indications that geographically explicit catastrophe models are useful to
investigate policy strategies.
For optimisation of a single policy variable, the current optimisation algorithm
worked fine. Other optimisation algorithms must be implemented in order to deal
with multiple policy variables.
Much work remains until the model can be used as a tool in integrated assess-
ment. The major challenge is to find the balance where the model is easy to learn
and use, without becoming simplistic and naive. A number of scenarios are under
construction, describing different insurance strategies. These scenarios will be tested
on the model, in a stakeholder workshop, which will take place in the autumn of
2002. Real GIS data has recently become available, and is now incorporated in the
Figure 10: Optimised coverage offered to five locations.
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model. Different experiments are being performed, where miscellaneous insurance
schemes are investigated. To make it possible to explore the consequences for indi-
viduals as well as for aggregates, the agents are being extended with the ability of
making decisions.
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